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COPYRIGHT LAW-THE EXTENSION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
TO COMPUTER OPERATING PROGRAMS-Apple Computer v. Franklin
Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. August 30, 1983)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last eight years the growing popularity of video game and
personal computers has created a recognized need to protect the devel
opers of the computer programs used in machines. Congress recog
nized the problem by revising the Copyright Act in 1976 1 and
appointing the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU).2 In 1980, Congress adopted the rec
ommendations of CONTU and amended the 1976 Copyright Act spe
cifically to include computer programs. 3 Notwithstanding the clear
statement that computer programs were protected by copyright, ques
tions arose as to the extent of the protection intended by Congress.
The court in Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer" answered one
question by holding that the copyright law protected5 fourteen com
puter operating programs, developed for use in the Apple II personal
computer and copied by Franklin for use in its ACE 100 personal
computer. 6 The court concluded that Congress intended to protect all
computer programs: those that interacted with humans, or applica
tion programs, and those that interacted only with machines, or oper
ating programs. 7
In order to understand the importance of Franklin both legally
and commercially, this note will discuss briefly the way in which per
sonal computers operate. Next, this note will examine the legislative
and case law developments of copyright protection for computer pro
grams from the advent of computers in the late 1940's to the decision
1. 17 U.S.C. (1982); (Copyright Act of 1976). Congress originally enacted Title 17 in
July, 1947, and revised it in its entirety by Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, effective January
1, 1978.

2. Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy
righted Works (July 31, 1978) (hereinafter CONTU REPORT).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code

Cong. & Ad. News 6460, 6482.
4. 714 F.2d 1240 (1983).
5. [d. at 1242-45.
6. [d. at 1253.
7. [d. at 1248-49.
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in Franklin in September of 1983. Finally, this note will consider the
decision in Franklin as following the implied intent of Congress to
grant copyright protection to all computer programs.

II.

TECHNICAL SUMMARY

The technological development in the 1970's of using silicon
chips to encode operating instructions for electronic devices initially
lead to the widespread use of hand calculators and in the 1980's to the
broad popularity of personal computers. Personal computers are pres
ently widely used by small businesses for such things as inventory con
trol or billing as well as for entertainment and educational instruction
in the home. Growing computer use has created a growth market for
software and peripheral modules, or hardware, which expands the use
of the computer system. 8 The expanded popularity of computers is
creating the demand for adaptable personal computers that perform a
wide variety of functions. 9 Thus, the marketability of personal com
puters clearly corresponds to their ability to adapt to available
software and hardware packages.
Programs in a computer's Central Processing Unit, or CPU, de
termines its adaptability. The CPU contains a system of operating
programslO that instructs the computer as to how and in what se
quence certain operations will occur. I I In order for software or hard
8. "Software" is a computer program that instructs the computer how to perform a
specific function. such as balancing a checkbook or playing a video game. "Peripheral
modules" are components that expand the functional tlexibility of the personal computer
and includes such items as a "disk drive" for reading data stored magnetically on a "tloppy
disk" and phone modules for connecting to commercial data bases or printers. "Floppy
disks" are thin tlexible magnetic disks used to store computer programs and data base sets.
which are not part of the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the computer but which inter
act with the CPU. See infra note ll. and accompanying text.
9. Families use personal computers for such diverse functions as typing a term paper,
arranging a musical score. calculating the monthly mortgage payments for homes being
sold. or performing a statistical analysis on the results of all the NFL football games played
in a given week.
10. Two general categories of computer programs exist: (1) The operating program
which contains instructions for the internal operation of the machine and of which the user
is normally unaware; and (2) application programs which generally interact with the user.
allowing the user to provide or obtain information or select alternate paths of the program.
See Apple Computer. Inc. v. Franklin Computer. 545 F. Supp. 812. 814 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
rev'd. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
11. For example, the CPU instructs the computer how to:
1) access outside information for temporary storage in its internal memory;
2) structure the internal memory in various configurations to maximize memory
capacity;
3) communicate with the user on either a printer or a video cathode ray (VCR).
which is essentially a T.V. screen.
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ware components to be compatible l2 with a particular computer, they
must be able to interact with the computer's CPU.13 In theory, a com
plex operating program such as exists in a CPU may be written in an
almost infinite number of ways and result in a nearly identical func
tional capacity.14 The theory is particularly true when no external
limitations exist on any of the variables to be used. As more program
ming parameters become limited by outside factors, IS however, the
more limited become the number of alternate methods in which a pro
gram can be written and still maintain wide adaptability.16 Only two
choices remain to a manufacturer trying to enter the field of personal
computers.
New entrants into the personal computer field may choose to de
velop and manufacture entirely innovative systems not compatible
with any previously existing software or hardware packages. They
would have both to develop and to manufacture a large number. of
products l7 that would meet great consumer resistance if the compo
nents were not compatible with equipment and application programs lS
already available. More likely, however, new entrants would want to
capitalize on the already existing market and make their products as
compatible as possible with software and hardware already available.
The most efficient way to achieve compatibility with a large per
centage of available software and hardware consists of copying some
of the key operating programs from the CPU of a popular personal
computer because, by definition, a wide range of support packages al
ready exists for it. A more difficult as well as more expensive way·to
achieve compatibility consists of developing a completely new operat
ing system that precisely duplicates the functional aspects of a CPU
from a popular personal computer. Franklin Computer faced pre
cisely this choice when it decided to enter the personal computer mar
12. "Compatible" means that the particular component can be used with a particular
computer.
13. The computer and the CPU must speak the same language in order to be com
patible. Small differences in the dialect of the language may preclude the use of specific
desirable software or hardware components.
14. See Note. Copyright Protection oj Computer Program Object Code. 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1723. 1736 (1983).
15. Outside factors include particular application programs and peripheral compo
nents already in existence and with which a new program must be compatible.
16. Franklin essentially used this argument in its case. See Franklin. 714 F.2d at
1245.
17. For instance. the new manufacturer would have to develop and manufacture its
own CPU. disk drive. and printer. as well as create its own version of the popular applica
tion programs including video games. word processing, and graphics.
18. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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ket in 1981. 19
III.

DEVELOPMENT

OF

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER
PROGRAMS

A.

1909 Copyright Act

The first commercial computers were built shortly after World
War II and were so large and expensive that only the federal govern
ment and the largest corporations considered owning them. Programs
created exclusively for the particular computer controlled the early
computers. 20 As the technology progressed, size and cost of operating
. computers decreased to the point that homes and small businesses now
widely use them. 21 With the increased use of computers came the com
mercial need to protect the computer programs that operated the
machine. Since copyright protection gave the holder the exclusive
right to reproduce, adapt, publish, perfonn or display the work,22
software producers sought its protection. 23 The copyright law of
1909, however, extended protection only to "copies which were per
ceptible to humans-things written or printed. . . in intelligible nota
tion."24 The Copyright Act of 1909 codified the rule laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in White-Smith Music Co. v.
Apollo CO.,2S in which the Court held that a piano roll was not a copy
of a musical composition since it would not be intelligibly perceived by
a human observer.26
The statutory language limited copyright protection to computer
programs written in "high-level" or programmer language. 27 Before a
computer can use a computer program, however, it must be written in
19. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. 812, 812-16 (E.D.
Pa., 1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3d err. 1983).
20. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
21. Id.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1981).
23. Chandler, Proprietary Protection of Computer Software, II U. BALT. L. REv.
195, 214 (1982).
24. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 779
(C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting White-Smith Music Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908».
25. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
26. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17. Only state law protected musical recordings until
Congress passed the Sound Recording Act of 1971. CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
27. Programmer languages include BASIC for personal computers, COBOL for
business computers, and FORTRAN for scientific computers. Languages employ English
like words and syntax and are easily understood by one trained in the language. Note,
Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1723, 1725
(1983).
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"machine" language or object code. 28 Since copyright protection did
not extend to the computer program in its useful form the value of the
copyright protection was dubious. The Registry of Copyrights ex
pressed these doubts when it decided to accept computer programs for
registration in 1964. 29 Tenuous protection continued until Congress
modernized the copyright law in the 1976 Copyright Act.

B.

1976 Copyright Act

In 1976, Congress greatly expanded the scope of material that
could be protected by copyright. Instead of limiting protection to
written or printed copies intelligible to human beings, Congress ex
tended protection to all "original works of authorship fixed in any tan
gible medium of expression" that could be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated "either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."30 Under section 102 of the Copyright Act, the inability of
a human being to understand binary code readily did not prevent its
copyright protection, provided that a copy of the work could have
been perceived or reproduced with the aid of a machine or device.
Thus, an application program or software generally perceivable with
the assistance of a computer would have been subject to copyright pro
tection. 31 Congress, however, left unanswered the question whether
the addition of section 117 to the 1976 Copyright Act would protect
computer programs. 32 Section 117 specifically preserved the existing
28. In object code, also known as binary code, the programmer reduces all instruc
tions of the program to clusters of "ones" and "zeros" which the machine can interpret as a
gate that is either open or closed. While a patient individual trained in the field could
theoretically read the clusters, as a trained individual could decode a piano roll, humans do
not normally nor easily read binary code. Id. For additional discussion see H. BRUNNER,
INTRODUCTION To MICROPROCESSORS, 1-12 (1982).
29. Chandler, Proprietary Protection of Computer Software, II U. BALT. L. REV.
195, 214 (1982).
30. 17U.S.C. § 102 (1981).
31. See supra note 10. A user perceives an application program through the com
puter or machine in use.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 117, as originally enacted by Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565
(1976). The original § 117 stated:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title
does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights
with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable
of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction
with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to works under
the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on
December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action
brought under this title.
Pub. L. 96-517,94 Stat. 3015, 3028 deleted the section in 1980.
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state of the law as to the extent of copyright protection for the use of
computer programs, without defining the law's status. 33 Congress
chose to wait and review the findings of CONTU before specifically
extending full copyright protection to computer programs. 34 During
the period of vagueness, the United States district courts reached the
conflicting opinions of Data Cash System, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc. 3s
and Tandy Corporation v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc. 36
In Data Cash, a district court in Illinois found that section 117 of
the Copyright Act of 1976 prohibited applying the rest of the 1976
Copyright Act to computer programs. 37 The court held that under
traditional common law a program stored on ROM was not a copy,
since it could not be interpreted by a human being, and thus the Copy
right Act did not protect it.3 8 A California district court, however,
reached the opposite conclusion on substantially the same facts in
Tandy Corp. 39
In Tandy Corp. the court found that section 117 did not deny all
copyright protection to programs but did limit the rights of a copy
right holder for copyrighted material used in a computer. 40 The court
determined that a program was a work of authorship under sections
101 and 102 of the Act.41 The court further found that a ROM is a
33. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 779
(C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
34. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 1. Congress specifically created CONTU
to investigate the desirability of extending copyright protection to computer programs.
35. Data Cash System, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. E.D.
1979).
36. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Ca.,
1981).
37. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1066-68. Data Cash had marketed Compuchess, a
hand-held computer capable of playing chess at six different levels of difficulty. The in
structions for playing were encoded on a ROM chip in each machine. A ROM, or Read
Only Memory, is an integrated circuit, or silicon chip, from which a computer can read a
program but which cannot be altered in any way. Franklin, 545 F. Supp. at 813. JS&A
Group began marketing a similar game containing a ROM with the identical program.
Data Cash had copyrighted the "programmer language" version of the program and had
marked all such copies with notice. The machine language version of the code was not
copyrighted, however, and Data Cash did not include notice of copyright on the ROM, the
Compuchess game itself, or its packaging. Id. at 1065-66.
38. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1068-69.
39. See Tandy Corp., 524 F. Supp. 171.
40. Id. at 174. the court in Tandy Corp. observed that § 117 did not apply to §§ 101
and 102, which identify the scope of copyrightable material, but applied only to §§ 106
through 116 and 118, which identify the scope of copyright protection. Id. See supra note
32.
41. Tandy Corp., 524 F. Supp. at 173. Section 102 states:
Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
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"tangible medium of expression" within the meaning of the Act such
that the Act protects a computer program embedded on a ROM.42
The court reasoned that since programs were copyrightable under sec
tions 101 and 102, Congress must have intended to grant the ROMs
some measure of protection.43 The court read section 117 as providing
limited protection to the use of an authorized copy of the program in a
computer, but fully protecting against the unauthorized copying of a
properly copyrighted work. 44
C.

1980 Amendment to the Copyright Act

Congress settled the disagreement over the copyrightability of
computer programs in 1980 when it amended the 1976 Copyright
Act. 45 CONTU in its final report had recommended that the copy
right law be amended to include computer programs explicitly.46
CONTU had further recommended the deletion of section 117, so that
protection would extend "to all computer uses of copyrighted pro
grams."47 In 1980 Congress wrote CONTU's recommendations into
law virtually verbatim. 48 As a result, although no longer did any issue
exist as to whether computer programs enjoyed copyright protec
tion,49 the issue did arise as to the extent of the protection.
The courts addressed the question of the scope of protection in
Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artie International,50 in which the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit specifically found that the 1976 Copy
right Act fully protected programs written in machine language or ob
ject code. 51 In Williams, the court inferred a clear Congressional
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following catego
ries: (I) literary works; . . .
17 U.S.c. § 102 (1981). Section 101 defines literary works to be "works . . . expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
the material objects . . . in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981).
42. Tandy Corp., 524 F. Supp. at 173. Section 101 states that "a work [is] fixed in a
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy. . . is sufficiently perma
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981). See supra note 41.
43. Tandy Corp., 524 F. Supp. at 174.
44. Id. at 174-75.
45. Pub. L. No. 95-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980).
46. CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 54.
47. Id.
48. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 782
(C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
49. See Stem Electronics v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2nd Cir. 1982).
50. Williams Electronics v. Arctic International, 685 F.2d 870 (3rd Cir. 1982).
51. Id. at 876-77; See also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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intent to grant copyright protection to programs in object code from
the broad language that Congress used in defining "copy" and "fixa
tion."52 The court specifically found that the definition of a copy in
cluded a ROM since it was a "material object in which a work is fixed
by any method . . . andfrom which the work can be perceived, repro
duced . . . either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."53
While most programs subject to litigation in this time were application
programs,54 some were operating programs. 55 In Williams and previ
ous cases, however, the parties never raised the question of whether
the nature of the program should affect copyrightability. In 1982,
however, Franklin Computer raised the issue as its primary defense in
a copyright infringement suit initiated by Apple Computer which was
seeking to protect 14 computer programs that it had developed for use
in its Apple II computer.56
IV.

THE DECISION

Apple Computer, Inc., was founded in 1976 and quickly became
an acknowledged leader in the field of personal computers, having sold
almost 400,000 computers by mid-1982.57 Franklin Computer, Inc., a
small computer firm, started in 1981 and sold approximately 1000
computers by mid-1982.58 Franklin Computers designed and manu
factured the ACE 100 personal computer and marketed it as being
capable of using the software packages and peripheral components
designed for use with the Apple 11.59 In order to achieve compatibil
ity, Franklin copied 14 of Apple's operating system programs. 60 Ap
52. Id. See also supra notes 41-42 and 52 and accompanying text.
53. Id. The court quoted the definition of copy from 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis
supplied by the court).
54. In Williams, Stern, and Data Cash the programs all concerned games that inter
acted with the user. See respectively: Williams, 685 F.2d at 872; Stern, 669 F.2d at 853;
and Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1066.
55. In Tandy Corp., the program at issue was an "input-output routine" that trans
lated programmer language into computer or machine language. Tandy Corp., 524 F.
Supp. at 173. Since any user of the machine remains unaware of the existence of the pro
gram, it is tenned an operating program. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
56. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1245.
57. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. 812, 812 (E.D. Pa.,
1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
58. Id.
59. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1242-43.
60. Id. at 1244. The 14 copied programs represented a cost of 46 man-months or
$740,000 to Apple Computer and included: Autostart ROM, which readies the various
internal components of the computer when it is turned on; three versions of "Beginners All
Purpose Instruction Code" (BASIC), which is used to translate instructions given by the
user into low level primary code that the computer understands; and ten programs relating
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pIe sued Franklin, alleging copyright infringement and seeking a
preliminary injunction to restrain Franklin from using, copying, or
selling any of the 14 programs. 61 Franklin never denied that it had
copied the Apple programs,62 but based its defense on the non
copyrightability of operating programs63 and an assertion that Frank
lin feasibly could not write its own programs. 64
The district court focused on the first of Franklin's defenses and
denied injunctive relief to Apple by concluding "that there is some
doubt as to the copyrightability of the programs described in this liti
gation."6s The court expressed doubts as to whether a program in
object code embodied on a ROM could be copyrighted. 66 Although
the third circuit in Williams Electronics clearly answered the question
in the affirmative,67 it announced its decision three days after the dis
trict court had decided Franklin. 68 The district court also concluded
that operating programs "eventually become an essential part of the
machinery that produces the results"69 and as a part of a machine are
more appropriately the subject of patent law and not copyright law.'o
While the appeal of the district court's decision was pending, a
district court in the ninth circuit granted a preliminary injunction to
Apple Computer against Formula International, a wholesaler of per
sonal computers, for copyright infringement of 5 of the 14 computer
programs that were denied copyright protection in Franklin. 71 The
court in Formula disagreed with the reasoning in Franklin and held
that the 1980 Amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act 72 protected op
erating programs. Relying on the recommendations of CONTU, the
to obtaining, storing, or manipulating application programs or information stored on a
"floppy disk," a method for expanding the useful memory of a computer. Id. at 1244-45 &
note 4.
61. Id. at 1244-45.
62. Id. at 1245.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1246 (quoting district court opinion, 545 F. SUpp. at 812).
66. Id. at 1246.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
68. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1249.
69. Franklin, 545 F. SUpp. at 824 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 88
(Commissioner Hershey dissenting) (emphasis deleted».
70. Id. at 823-24.
71. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 778
(C.D. Cal. 1983), a./J'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). Formula International was selling a
personal computer under the trademark Pineapple. The Pineapple kits were manufactured
by independent companies in Taiwan and Hong Kong and were distributed by Formula,
both at resale and wholesale. Id. at 777.
72. Id. at 779.
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district court opined "that all computer programs.. [should] be
included within copyright protection."73 Observing that Congress had
enacted the recommendations of CONTU into law almost verbatim,
the court inferred that Congress did not intend to distinguish "be
tween programs which are used in the production of further copy
righted works" and those which embody "a system for the operation
of a machine."74
Prior to the third circuit's decision on the appeal of Franklin, the
computer industry faced conflicting legal theories supporting conflict
ing decisions as to the copyrightability of operating programs. In re
versing the district court in Franklin, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals resolved the conflict by holding that the 1980 amendment to
the 1976 Copyright Act extended copyright protection to all pro
grams. 75 The appellate court raised three legal issues that would de
termine the copyrightability of Apple's operating computer programs:
1) Does expressing a program in object code affect copyrightability;
2) maya program embodied in a ROM be copyrighted; and 3) mayan
operating program be copyrighted. 76 Although the same court had
previously dealt with the first two issues in Williams Electronics, it
dealt separately with each issue in order to clarify its Williams
opinion.77
A.

Copyrightability of a Computer Program Expressed in Object
Code and Embodied in ROM

The court followed its earlier decision in Williams Electronics,
holding that the 1980 amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act pro
tected programs expressed in object code. 78 The court acknowledged
that Chapter 17 U.S.C. section 102(a) did not specifically enumerate
programs within the list of works of authorship.79 It found in the 1980
73. Id. at 781 (emphasis supplied by the court). The court continued:
The copyright status of the written rules for a game or a system for the operation
of a machine is unaffected by the fact that those rules direct the actions of those
who play the game or carry out the process. Nor has copyright been denied to
works simply because of their utilitarian aspects. It follows, therefore, that there
should be likewise no distinction made between programs which are used in the
production offurther copyrighted works and those which are not.
Id. at 781-82 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 21) (emphasis supplied by the
court).
74. Id. at 782.
75. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253-54.
76. Id. at 1246.
77. Id. at 1249-50..
78. Id. at 1248.
79. Id. at 1247.
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Amendment to the CopYright Act,80 however, a Congressional en
dorsement of the suggestion of CONTU to extend copyright protec
tion to programs. 81 The court examined the primary requirements to
make a work copyrightable identified in the copyright statute; that is,
the work "must be an 'original wor[k] of authorship,' and [it] must be
'fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression.' "82 Section 102 next de
fines works of authorship to include literary works.83 The section de
fines literary works as "works. . . expressed in words, numbers. . .
or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature. . . in which
they are embodied."84 The court concluded that the expression of a
program in object code does not negate its copyright classification as a
work of authorship.8s Section 101 further defines a copy to be a "ma
terial object, . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced. . . either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device."86 The court of appeals rejected the opinion of
the district court that copyright protection should be "limited to
works designed to be 'read' by a human reader"87 by observing that
the statute allows communication "either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."88 The court concluded that copyright protection
did extend, therefore, to programs expressed in object code.
B.

Copyrightability of Computer Operating System Programs

The court found Franklin's argument that "computer operating
system programs, as distinguished from application programs, are not
the proper subject of copyright 'regardless of the language or medium
in which they are fixed' " to be a novel issue not previously raised with
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 89 Section 102(b) of the 1976
Copyright Act provides that in "no case does copyright protection
. extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera
80. Pub.L. No. 95-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980). Congress enacted into law the
recommendations of CONTU essentially verbatim. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1984). See CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 1.
81. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1247.
82. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(I) (1981».
83. 17 U.S.C. § 102a(l) (1981).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981).
85. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1249. The clusters of ones and zeros that represent binary
or object code would qualify as "numerical symbols or indicia." See Note, Copyright Pro
tection o/Computer Program Object Code 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1726-27 (1983).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981).
87. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1248 (quoting district court opinion, 545 F. Supp. at 821).
88. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1981) (emphasis supplied by the court).
89. Id. at 1249-50 (quoting Brief of Appellee at 15).
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tion . . regardless of the form in which it is described. . or embod
ied. . . ."90 Franklin maintained that "an operating system program
is either a 'process', a 'system' or 'method of operation' and thus un
copyrightable under § 102."91 In addition, Franklin suggested that
section 102(b) represented a codification of the rule set down in Baker
v. Seldon 92 that copyright laws may not be used to obtain and hold a
monopoly over an idea. 93 Franklin repeated the opinion expressed by
the dissenting members of CONTU that "the instructions themselves
eventually become an essential part of the machinery that produces the
results. They may become . . . a permanent part of the actual ma
chinery. . . . "94 In response to Franklin's assertions, the court stated
that copyright law protects only the specific instructions actually ex
pressed in a program and does not protect the general process or
method of operation that might result from them. 9s The court de
clared that the confusion expressed by the district court resulted from
mistakenly focusing on the "physical characteristics of the instruc
tions" and not on the instructions themselves. 96
The court next addressed the issue of the copyrightability of a
computer operating program as a purely utilitarian work. Franklin
relied on dictum in Baker v. Seldon stating that "where the art it
teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams
used . . . such methods and diagrams are to be considered as neces
sary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public. . . . "97
Although a literal construction of the court's language would apply to
all operating programs, the court of appeals found a previous Supreme
Court case, Mazer v. Stein,98 controlling. 99 In Mazer, the Court stated
"we find nothing in the copyright statute. . . that the intended use or
use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its
registration."I°O The court of appeals in Franklin also relied on
90. 17 U.S.c. § 102(b) (1981).
91. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1250.
92. 101 U.S. 99 (1974). Baker involved a copyright infringement suit over an ac
countant book that used pages ruled and arranged in a manner first described and displayed
in a book explaining a particular bookkeeping system. The court in Baker held that "the
copyright of a book does not give the [author] the exclusive right to use the system ex
plained in the books." Id. at 100.
93. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1251-52.
94. CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 28 (emphasis in the report).
95. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1250-51.
96. Id. at 1251.
97. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
98. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
99. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252.
100. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218.
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CONTU's rejection of the Baker doctrine as implying congressional
intent that the ultimate use of a program would not affect its
copyrightability.101 The Franklin court concluded, therefore, that
limiting the use of a program to make a machine functional does not
negate the protection extended to the program as a literary work of
art. 102
In concluding that Congress did not intend to distinguish be
tween operating and application programs when granting copyright
protection, the court of appeals emphasized the statutory definition of
"computer program" added to section 101 of the Act by the 1980
Amendment. 103 Congress defined a computer program as "a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com
puter in order to bring about a certain result." 104 The court specifically
agreed with the interpretation of the court in Formula International 105
when it stated "there is nothing in any of the statutory terms which
suggest a different result for different types of computer programs
based upon the function they serve in the machine."I06
C.

The Effect on Copyright Protection When the Computer Program
Merges with the Idea

Finally, the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the
expression of an idea in an operating program could become so
merged with the idea it, represented as to preclude copyright protec
tion under section 102.107 Traditionally, patent law protects an idea
for seventeen years if the idea has been successfully reduced to prac
tice.108 Copyright, on the other hand, protects only the expression of
an idea. 109 The court held that if the creation of other computer pro
grams that performed the same function as Apple's operating system
programs were possible, then the program represented only an expres
sion of the idea and hence were copyrightable. 110 Since the district
101. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252. See note 79 and accompanying text.
Id.
103. Id.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981) (emphasis added).
105. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). See also notes 70-73 and accompanying
text.
,
106. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252 (quoting Formula International, 562 F. Supp. at
780).
107. Id. at 1252. Section 102 prohibits the extension of copyright protection to any
idea. See note 90 and accompanying text.
108. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 16.
109. Id.
110. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253.
102.
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court had made no finding of fact as to whether Apple's operating
programs represented the only means of expressing their underlying
ideas, the circuit court remanded the issue to the district court. III
V.

ANALYSIS

The traditional purpose of copyright law is to encourage disclo
sure of intellectual or aesthetic ideas to the public, promoting public
availability of the ideas by protecting the creator's perceived rights in
them. 112 In modem times, a secondary purpose of protecting intellec
tual property capable of extensive reproduction has developed. ll3
With the recent popularity of personal computers, the need to protect
computer programs has arisen out of both concerns. The development
of programs requires creativity, time, and money, thus necessitating
the protection of creators' investments so that they may reap the bene
fits of their initiative. Similarly, since programs constitute an integral
part of video games, personal computers, and work processors that all
enjoy increased popularity, the desire as well as ability to reproduce
programs has become extensive.
Congress recognized the need for protection during its revision of
the Copyright Act in 1976 and appointed CONTU to study the prob
lem and to make commendations,l14 As a result of its study, CONTU
recommended extending copyright protection to computer pro
grams. IIS CONTU's intent to include all computer programs in the
expanded protection can be inferred from the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Hersey 116 and the concurring opinion of Commissioner
Nimmer.ll7 Both opinions questioned CONTU's wisdom in recom
mending "open-ended copyright protection for all computer
software."1l8 In 1980, Congress wrote into law virtually verbatim
CONTU's recommendations l19 including the deletion of the original
section 117 and the addition of the definition of computer program in
111. Id. Conflicting evidence surfaced during the trial, with Franklin presenting wit
nesses testifying to the impossibility of rewriting the Apple programs and Apple claiming
that third parties had already produced comparable programs. Id. at 1245.
112. Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1723, 1739 (1983).
113. Id.
114.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 84. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
Id. at 85. See id. at 86-90.
See supra notes71-79 and accompanying text.
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section 101. 120 The Congressional action created a strong inference
that the 1980 amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act encompassed the
intent of CONTU's Report. 121 The court of appeals in Franklin rec
ognized the inference l22 and honored it. 123 The third circuit thus
agreed with the only other reported case that had addressed the
issue. 124
Commissioners Hersey and Nimmer of CONTU both expressed
doubts about the Commission's failure to articulate any rationale that
distinguished computer programs from any other "tangible expression
of any and all original ideas."12s In particular, Nimmer articulated his
concern that such a broad construction of literary works could result
in transforming the Copyright Act into a general misappropriation
law, equally applicable to areas traditionally left unprotected as well as
to areas of traditional patent protection. 126 Judge Newcomber, in his
opinion in Franklin, echoed Commissioner Nimmer's concern and
worried that such a wide application of copyright protection would
circumvent the antimonopoly limitations established by patent law. 127
While the Commissioners' concerns may yet prove to be justified, Con
gress has chosen for the present not to institute an arbitrary limit to
the copyrightability of a computer program based solely upon its char
acterization as either an application or operating program.
The court of appeals in Franklin did, however, recognize at least
one limitation to the copyrightability of programs under existing law.
The court found that section 102 of the Act prohibited copyright pro
tection if the program, or expression of the idea, so merged to the idea
that they became inseparable. 128 If other programs could be created
that would duplicate the functions of the existing program, however,
then the original program would be only an expression of the idea
120. Pub. L. No. 95-517. 94 Stat. 3015.3028 (1980). The original § 117 limited the
copyright protection available to computer programs. See supra notes 32-44 and accompa
nying text.
121. Formula International. 562 F. Supp. at 781.
122. Franklin. 714 F.2d at 1247.
123. Id. at 1253-54.
124. Id. at 1252 (citing Apple Computer. Inc. v. Formula International. Inc.• 562 F.
Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983). affd. 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984».
125. CONTU REPORT. supra note 2 at 84-85.
126. Id. at 85 (emphasis in the report).
127. Franklin. 545 F. Supp. at 824. "A submission for patent protection must be
novel. useful and non-obvious." Chandler. Proprietary Protection o/Computer Software. U.
DALT. L. REV. 195.231 (1982). In addition copyright protection lasts for the life of the
author plus at least 50 years. while patent protection is limited to 17 years. CONTU RE
PORT. supra note 2 at 72.
128. Franklin. 714 F.2d at 1252; see supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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behind the program and capable of copyright protection. 129 Although
the court's limitation appears to be a straightforward mechanical test,
a court retains a degree of flexibility in applying the limitation, since
its applicability will hinge on how broadly or narrowly the court de
fines the primary function of the program. The narrower or more
specific the functions defined as primary to the program, the more dif
ficult it will be to demonstrate the possibility of alternate programs.
The court of appeals in Franklin found that compatibility with
Apple II software and hardware was not a primary function of the
programs but rather "a commercial and competitive objective" of
Franklin and, therefore, not pertinent to the question of whether the
programs had merged with the ideas. 13o The court did not clearly ar
ticulate the test it had applied nor did it indicate what facts would be
necessary to find that compatibility with existing software and hard
ware had been a primary function of a program. Such a finding would
increase the probability that a court would then find a merger between
the program and the idea, thereby barring copyrightability. Thus,
while the court of appeals in Franklin extended copyright protection
to include operating programs, it also recognized a statutory limitation
to the copyrightability of programs that courts in the future may use
to deny the full protection of copyright law in a case in which such
extensive protection would prove to be detrimental to the public good.
In his concurring opinion in the CONTU report, Commissioner
Nimmer observed that Congress possesses the ability to modify the
extent of copyright protection offered programs if the present law
proves unduly restrictive. \31 Nimmer recommended that a logical line
of demarcation is to limit copyright protection to only those programs
that produce works that themselves qualify for copyright protec
tion.132 Thus, programs designed to operate in conjunction with a
data retrieval system or video game would be copyrightable but a pro
gram that turns lights on and off in an office building or regulates the
mixture of air and fuel in an engine would not. Commissioner Nim
mer's limitation is particularly appropriate in light of the recent Dia
mond v. Diehr 133 decision in which the Supreme Court rejected the
patent examiner's conclusion that because a process used a computer
program to achieve its result it fell outside patent law.134 Since a to
129.
130.

131.
132.

133.
134.

Id. at 1252-53.
Id.
CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 26.
Id.
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 175; see The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1981).
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tally utilitarian program may now be protected as it is actually used in
a patentable machine or process, the value of copyright protection,
which is limited only to the expression and not the idea embodied in
the program,13S apparently is diminished. If full copyright protection
for all programs proves to be too cumbersome, Congress may well de
cide that patent law adequately protects utilitarian programs and,
therefore, deny additional protection under copyright law.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

With the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Frank
lin, federal courts apparently are following a uniform interpretation of
the 1976 Copyright Act, as amended in 1980, and are extending copy
right protection to all computer programs. The judicial interpretation
is based upon the clear recommendations made by CONTU. Copy
right protection extends only to the expression of instructions of the
computer program itself and not to the ideas, systems, or processes it
represents. If a particular computer program constitutes the only pos
sible method for expressing its underlying idea, then the theory states
that the expression merges with the idea and copyright protection is
not available. If Congress eventually decides that the broad inclusion
of all computer programs under the Copyright Act is unduly restric
tive, it may decide to limit protection to computer programs that pro
duce works that themselves qualify for copyright protection.

Richard G. Weber

135. Patent law protects the idea as actually used in the invention, independent of its
fonn. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.

